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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry
83-3932

3 August 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Countermeasures Organization Study

1. I send you herewith the Countermeasures Organization Study prepared for the SIG/Intelligence by the IG/Countermeasures pursuant to NSSD-2/82.

2. This study, together with the companion study done by the Interagency Group on Counterintelligence, completes the second and final phase of the Executive Branch's response to NSSD-2/82, which called for a review of the policies, capabilities and organization of the Government to detect and counter the threat posed by hostile intelligence collection.

3. This study has done something that has not been done before. It has pulled together and surveyed all of the Government's countermeasures programs from an organizational standpoint. These include the more general programs with which we are all familiar: security classification, personnel security, and physical security measures, as well as those more narrowly focused programs of which there is less appreciation, such as those that provide us warning of hostile intelligence collectors and those that protect our ports and airways.

4. Although the countermeasures programs of the U.S. Government are related in their objective, they are for the most part organized separately and distinctly, depending largely on the nature of the particular threat they attempt to counter and the manner in which such action is undertaken. There has been no previous effort to bring such programs under any form of comprehensive national management and it is the conclusion of the study that any attempt to do so would be infeasible, and if attempted would be counterproductive.

5. The study was endorsed without dissent at SIG/Intelligence meeting on 1 August. The main followup work indicated includes the following:

a. Develop a methodology to organize resource data on the different and dispersed activities making up our overall countermeasures program and prioritize the improvements that are needed. This is a substantial job but it can be organized under the auspices of IG/Countermeasures and is likely to take close to a year.

b. The current national structure for communications security should be reexamined and consideration given to reconstituting the National Communications Security Committee, now an advisory body to the Secretary of Defense, as an NSC-level policy-developing body. The National Communications Security Committee should review the process by which the communications security requirements in the departments and agencies are assessed and satisfied.

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c. There is a need for improved collection and dissemination of threat data on audio and other technical access to US communications. Perhaps this can best be done under the auspices of the DCI's Security Committee.

d. The NSC has previously received a recommendation for the establishment of an Operation Security Committee to develop a national policy to address improvements in protection against Soviet ELINT and imaging capabilities. This could be established as a subcommittee or component of IG/Countermeasures.

e. For personnel security there is need for greater uniformity in clearance standards, investigative standards, adjudication and oversight. Pursuant to NSDD-84 this is being addressed by the Attorney General Working Group charged with reviewing federal personnel security policy and procedures. I understand this report is to be advisory. As you know, I consider it important that any action taken pursuant not be permitted to dilute the security clearance standards for access to compartmented intelligence which have been established pursuant to the DCI's statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods. It is also important that action taken with respect to security standards pursuant to the recommendations of the Attorney General's Working Group reflect considerations of and be coordinated with proposals developed by the Office of Personnel Management to rationalize background investigations for purposes of determining suitability for Federal employment. I understand that the Attorney General's report on personnel standards is due in October and I would recommend that you be briefed by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management on the proposals developed there for refocusing and making more effective the clearance investigations of personnel throughout the Federal Government.

f. Computer security will be a very large problem. A study has already been commissioned under the auspices of the Intelligence Community Staff and should be completed sometime around the turn of the year. When that study is evaluated there should be an overall review of policy and organization of computer security requirements.

William J. Casey

Attachment:
Countermeasures Organization
Study, Copy 85

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